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Abstract: This paper investigates the phenomenon of stand-up comedians per-
forming in more than one language, which poses the question of whether and
how they translate their material. Past research on stand-up comedy underlines its
conversational nature, sometimes at the expense of recognizing its content.
Empirical evidence collected from interviews with bilingual stand-up comedians,
on the other hand, suggests that they perform a form of oral self-translation,
which implies a tertium comparationis, the transfer of content. The notion of
mental text, borrowed from ethnography, is then productively used to define
this content. As is then suggested, two types of memory, namely declarative and
procedural, are involved in the memorization of this mental text. The declarative
part accounts for what is repeatable across performances and is the part involved
in conscious translation; its minimal content is identified in the punch lines. The
procedural part accounts for variation, improvisation and interaction. A model of
the oral-self translation process of stand-up is then proposed. I conclude that re-
focusing on the (mental) text of stand-up comedy can offer a better understanding
of its translation, which in turn can contribute to a better understanding of humor
in a multilingual and multicultural context in future research.
Keywords: stand-up comedy, orality, translation, self-translation, bilingualism,
migration
1 Introduction
Stand-up comedians are increasingly choosing to perform in more than one
language, both in response to situations of migration and to adapt to an ever
more globalized comedy industry. This phenomenon raises the questions of
whether stand-up comedians translate their own material across languages, of
*Corresponding author: Giacinto Palmieri, Centre for Translation Studies, School of English and
Languages, University Library and Learning Centre, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, E-mail: youcancallmegiac@gmail.com
Humor 2017; aop
© 2017 Palmieri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/1/17 7:15 PM
what challenges they face in doing so and of how they address these chal-
lenges. I myself have been performing comedy in both English and Italian for
the past four years, and have used this experience as the basis for an inves-
tigation on these issues. To this introspective starting point, I then added an
observational aspect, namely interviews with other bilingual stand-up come-
dians. In particular, I conducted nine in-depth semi-structured interviews: four
with fellow Italian comedians who regularly perform on the London circuit in
both English and Italian (Giada Garofalo, Romina Puma, Luca Cupani,
Federica Bonomi), two with Italian comedians based in Italy who performed
in English in the UK (Francesco De Carlo and Antonello Taurino) and three
with non-Italian comedians with a wide experience of performing in two
languages (Katsura Sunshine, Magnus Betnér and Katerina Vrana). These
interviews were taken in person, recorded and, in some cases, translated into
English. The transcription/translation was then sent to them for their approval.
A consent form was also sent, which included the consent to be identified by
name in publications deriving from this research. While full transcriptions and
full thematic analyses will be made available in forthcoming publications, this
article only contains few excerpts (from participants Giada Garofalo and
Romina Puma) that were considered pertinent to the problem of the orality
and/or textuality of stand-up comedy.
In particular, this article offers an outline of the theoretical model I devel-
oped to make sense of the phenomenon investigated. The relationship between
the empirical evidence collected from the interviews and the elaboration of this
model followed the path of an iterative bidirectional process, as suggested, for
instance, by Hammersley (1989) as part of his inductive analysis methodology:
a first elaboration of this model informed the choice of questions, while later
the answers helped me to revise the model. In particular, the starting point
was the perception, first derived from self-observation and later corroborated
by the interviews, that while stand-up comedy is essentially an oral form of
communication, at the same time it is a form in which some kind of text should
be recognized in order to justify what is constant in a series of performance of
the same “thing” for instance of the same Edinburgh Fringe Festival show.
This has important implications for translation, which needs to be a transla-
tion of something. If translation is taking place in stand-up comedy, then, an
applicable theory will require a notion of text capable of accounting for what is
repeatable and constant in a series of oral performances, while also account-
ing for what is not, i. e. the text’s openness to variation and improvisation.
Theoretical accounts of stand-up comedy currently available in the literature,
on the other hand, either negate that a text-based approach is relevant to
its study (e. g. Rutter 1997) or attribute to the text of stand-up comedy a
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rigidity that is actually specific to other comic genres, such as canned jokes (e.
g. Attardo 2001). Once this new theoretical model of stand-up comedy text is
outlined, a model of the phases involved in its oral self-translation can also be
attempted. While the first model aims to fill a gap in humor studies, the second
aims to fill a gap in translation studies. Existing studies in the latter field, for
instance Akai (1997) and Wilson (2011), focus exclusively on what we might
call oral-to-written self-translation. Bilingual stand-up comedy, on the other
hand, offers the opportunity to study a form of self-translation that is oral in
both its source and its target.
2 Stand-up comedy: an oral form of expression
and its oral self-translation
The starting point of the present investigation is the recognition that stand-up
comedy represents an oral form of expression: it is, indeed, not possible to assume
the presence of a written text as the point of departure for a series of perfor-
mances. This seems to be corroborated by the data collected from the point of
view of translation. For instance, Giada Garofalo declares, “I start from something,
what I don’t do is starting again from the script, I don’t translate the ‘original’
script. Sometime I improvise the translation directly on the stage.”
Even when a written script is present, it seems to play a very limited
function, as it shown in this passage, in which Giada is asked by me (“GP”) to
comment on the script of her show for the Edinburgh Fringe Festival 2013:
GP – It is written as if to be performed word by word. Did you follow it word by word in the
performance too?
GG – Not at all, for instance there are entire chunks of it that I actually never performed.
Other parts were changed, without me updating the written script accordingly.
GP – What if you were asked to translate the show into Italian? Would you also write it
word by word in the Italian version?
GG – No, maybe two years ago, but not now.
GP – What would the starting point be, then? The show how you developed it in the
meantime?
GG – Yes, of course, there would be no point in “going backwards.”
Giada Garofalo’s starting point in this (although hypothetical) translation
would, then, be something that in that form was never fixed on paper. Moreover,
what might at first sight appear as pre-performance scripts in fact represent, in
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many cases, post-event transcripts of a specific performance. An example in this
sense is offered by comedian Lee (2010), who offers to the reader a collection of
entire show transcripts, commented in great depth by the comedian himself by
means of very detailed footnotes. These footnotes make clear that many passages
are, for instance, just “a transcript of what happened in one occasion” (2010: 182)
and that “[a]ll this stuff was different every night” (2010: 265). On the contrary,
written comedians’ notes are indeed antecedent to the performances, but not all
comedians make use of them. For instance, comedian Jay Leno declares: “I have
nothing written down […] I just keep it in my head. The good jokes I remember, the
bad ones I forget” (Ajaye 2002: 122–123). Evenwhenpresent, written texts are simply
used as mnemonic tools. This view is consistent with the latest developments in the
debate about the nature of orality itself.
While earlier studies, as exemplified by Ong (1982), saw oral forms of
expressions as radically different in nature from written forms, Carr (2005)
proposed a new paradigm, which he called “oral-written interface” (2005: 4).
This approach is based on interpreting the writings of the ancient Greeks,
Mesopotamians, Egyptians, and of the people of ancient Israel, as tools to
enable the oral transmission of the texts, particularly by assisting memorization:
writing was mainly seen as “writing on the tablet of the heart” (2005: 127).
The same can be said about the specific form of “writing” behind stand-up
comedy performances.
If stand-up comedy is an oral form of communication, making sense of the
phenomenon of stand-up comedians translating their own material requires a
specific notion of translation: I will call it oral self-translation as, in translation
studies, the term self-translation is used to label the type of translation in which
the author and the translator happen to be the same person. As mentioned in the
introduction, the literature does not recognize what we might call oral-to-oral
self-translation, i. e. of a form of self-translation where an instance of oral
discourse in the source language is translated into an equally oral instance of
discourse in the target language.
This oral-to-oral linguistic transfer appears to be what bilingual stand-up
comedians do with their own material. The evidence collected in this study from
the interviews seems, indeed, to suggest that the need to “write things down” as
part of the translation process is only felt when the linguistic competence is
weak and is felt by the comedians themselves as a limitation. A case in point is
offered by Romina Puma, who reported the following:
[the passage to English] was three years after moving to London and it was terrifying!
In Italian I could write down some “bullet points” only and improvise from there, but
I didn’t trust myself to do the same in English, instead I had to write down and memorize
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every single word, as we used to do at school with those poems by Giacomo Leopardi! That
meant that, on stage, I was terrified, since, for instance, I knew I wouldn’t be able to
respond to hecklers.
This was not a problem, on the other hand, for previously quoted comedian
Giada Garofalo when she prepared her show for the Edinburgh Fringe Festival
2013, at which time she had been living in England for eleven years. When
linguistic competence allows, then, the text of stand-up comedy is developed as
an oral text and its translation appears to be a form of oral-to-oral translation.
3 The concept of mental text and its
declarative/procedural nature
Once established that there might be such a thing as oral-to-oral self-translation,
the question of what can be identified as its source text and target text arises.
In the case of oral self-translation of stand-up comedy, this points to the
more general question of what constitutes the text of stand-up comedy itself.
Rutter (1997) underlines the conversational nature of stand-up comedy and sug-
gests that “[t]raditional text-based analyses cannot record, and therefore facilitate,
the exploration of the interactive nature of humor” (1997: 291). Rutter is arguably
right in underlining the importance of interaction in stand-up comedy. The ques-
tion, however, is what the comedians bring to this interaction, apart from their
personality, history and attitudes. Indeed, it is not as a blank slate of conversa-
tional intentions that the comedians approach the stage. On the contrary, they
approach it with the intention of having a specific type of conversation, a con-
versation with a specific content. If it is true that “it is how you say it”, to quote a
well-known adage about jokes, there must also be an “it” that is said.
Rutter does not deny all this, but considers the content of what is said less
relevant than other aspects of the stand-up comedy “conversation”. An example he
cites as evidence to this point is the episode of a Big Issue reviewer joining the
general laughter for a joke during a performance by Johnny Vegas, and reporting
this experience in his review along with a transcription of the joke, despite com-
pletely misunderstanding the content of the joke itself (1997: 196).
While interestingly revealing of the contagious and social nature of laughter (and,
maybe, of the level of competence of some comedy reviewers), this example clearly
represents an extreme case and can only be viewed as an exception to what occurs
in the comedy room. It will be difficult, in fact, to deny that behind the laughter from
most people in the room there needs to be at least some common understanding of
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what is said; otherwise, the very conversational nature of stand-up comedy would
be lost, since it would be a conversation apropos of nothing.
If the search for the text of stand-up comedy is relevant and pertinent, the
quote from Jay Leno reported above can now be read as providing a positive
suggestion on where to locate it. While negating the existence of something “on
paper”, Jay Leno assures that there is something “in the head”. This remark has
an aura of familiarity with what was suggested by ethnographer Barber, accord-
ing to whom in oral performances “[s]omething identifiable is understood to
have pre-existed the moment of utterance […] [that] can be held to exist is in
people’s minds or memories” (2005: 325).
Indeed, the notion that a text can be located “in the mind” is not completely
new. In his study about the ontological status of texts, philosopher Gracia (1996)
introduces the notion of mental text as a separate entity from the physical text.
According to the theory presented in his study, however, a mental text is still
dependent on the presence of a written text: it is the mental image of a written text
(1996: 23), which either follows it, for instance in the reader’s mind during the act of
reading, or precedes it, for instance in the writer’s mind during the act of writing
(1996, 24: 25). The mental text, then, does not necessarily appear a posteriori in the
mental reproduction of thewritten text, but can also appear a priori in its production.
To recall Chomsky (1965), the notion of mental text, consequently, seems to acquire
the aspect of a form of competence which underlies and makes possible the perfor-
mance of the concrete act of writing the text. It would not require, at this point, a
great effort of theoretical imagination to extend this notion to the idea of a mental
text that underlies and makes possible a series of oral performances.
This very extension, although apparently in total autonomy from Gracia
(1996), has been proposed by ethnographer Honko (1996) in order to describe
the “something” behind the performances of singers of epics along the Silk Roads:
To be able to understand the production of text in actual performance, it seems necessary
to postulate a kind of “pre-narrative,” a pre-textual frame, that is, an organized collection
of relevant conscious and unconscious material present in the singer’s mind. This material
consists of (1) textual elements and (2) generic rules for reproduction; we may call it a
“mental text.” (Honko 1996: 1)
This notion of a mental text might raise methodological concerns, since it seems to
locate the text in a realm that is not open to direct investigation, as observed by Claus
(2000). Fortunately, researchers on self-translation of stand-up comedy enjoy an
obvious advantage over people who study singers of oral traditions along the Silk
Roads: a much easier access to the performers themselves. Interviews, introspection
and, more generally speaking, a phenomenological approach to the “experience” of
translating become, consequently, central to this type of investigation.
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The mental text, then, first of all seems to be something that is “present in the
singer’s mind” (Honko 1996: 1), or more generally the performer’s mind, across time,
since typically it needs to enable not only a single performance, but a series of
performances. If, for instance, potential audience members read a review of the fifth
performance of the festival run of a comedy show and decide to go and see its
seventh performance, this decision is only justifiable under the assumption that
there is something that is permanent across all performances. As Barber puts it: “it is
clear that what happens in most oral performances is not pure instantaneity, pure
evanescence, pure emergence and disappearance into the vanishing moment”
(Barber 2005: 325). The mental text, then, is something that is stored. Similarly,
Attardomentions the need for a theory of humorous texts to recognize “the presence
of a ‘storage area’ for the information that is being assumed, shared and developed
by the text” (1996: 88). The abstractness of the term “storage area” is probably due to
the fact that the paper was originally developed in the course of a workshop about
computational humor, but in the all too human context of this article the term
“memory” is sufficiently comprehensive. An investigation on memory in oral tradi-
tion has been attempted by Rubin (1995), although with a specific interest for
mnemonic techniques. In more general terms, talking about memory allows to
take advantage of the considerable literature dedicated to this subject in the fields
of cognitive psychology and neurology, for instance, with regard to the classification
of memory systems (for an overview: Squire 2004) and the different types of content
associated with them. Indeed, the second aspect of the mental text described in the
passage quoted from Honko is, so to speak, its double nature: a mental text is
constituted both of “textual elements” (Honko 1996: 1) and by “rules of production”
(Honko 1996: 1). If we consider, then, that the mental text is stored in memory, the
question that arises is whether these different types of content are stored in different
types of memory. Answering this question would allow a better understanding of
what the contents of a mental text might entail.
Many authors in the field of cognitive science distinguish between declara-
tive and procedural memory (for a brief literature review see: Ullman 2004).
First, declarative memory “refers to the capacity for conscious recollection
about facts and events” (Squire 2004) and “can be divided into semantic
memory (facts about the world) and episodic memory (the capacity to re-
experience an event in the context in which it originally occurred)” (Squire
2004: 174). On the other hand, procedural memory is the type of memory that
“subserves the learning of new, and the control of established, sensori-motor
and cognitive ‘habits’, ‘skills’, and other procedures, such as riding a bicycle
and skilled game playing” (Ullman 2004: 237). Its learning and recollection is
mostly unconscious and, for this reason, is also referred to as “implicit mem-
ory” (Ullman 2004: 237).
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The latter point shows why the mental text of stand-up comedy cannot
be considered as exclusively procedural. If it were so, performing a comedy
set in a different language would just be akin to riding a different bike, to use a
well-known metaphor of procedural skills. If this was the case, however, there
would be no need for any conscious translation and the (unconscious) transla-
tion would just happen “on the stage”, not prior to the performance, since
chronological precedence would require conscious recollection. The phenomen-
ological evidence collected both from the interviews and from my own intro-
spection, however, seems to be in strong contradiction with this hypothesis:
comedians do seem to ask themselves questions of translation, which are both
conscious and chronologically antecedent to the performance itself. For exam-
ple, participant Giada Garofalo reported in her interview the following:
when the punch line of a joke happens to be culture-specific or language-specific […] I
need to spend more time on finding an equivalent in the other language, in advance to the
first performance in it.
On the other hand, if the mental text of stand-up comedy was stored exclusively
in declarative (semantic) memory it would not be any different from the script of
a play. What would not be accounted for, in that case, would be the ability of
the comedian to improvise asides, to counter-react to the audiences’ reactions,
to respond to hecklers, to recognize what comedians call “the elephant in the
room” (latecomers, noises, uncomfortable environment, news that are likely to
be in everybody’s mind). There is, it appears, the need to recognize that the
comedian approaches the stage not only with (declarative) contents in mind, but
also armed with (procedural) skills.
The failure to make sense of the mental text of stand-up comedy in either
exclusively procedural terms or in exclusively declarative terms points to the
recognition of its double procedural/declarative nature. This recalls Ullman’s
(2004) hybrid declarative/procedural model of language, in which linguistic
competence itself is described as constituted by both declarative (for instance,
lexicon) and procedural (for instance, grammar) elements. Moreover, this double
procedural/declarative nature of the mental text, and the distinction between
these two aspects, might also shed some light onto the relationship between the
content of oral discourse and the mode of its production in performance, in
other words, the “how” in the customary observation that “it’s how you tell it”.
The performative aspects of a mental text can be seen as one of the main
constituents of its procedural part. What seems to be the case, then, is that a
“stack” of procedural skills can be recognized as being deployed in perfor-
mance: from the most generic linguistic competence described by Ullman
(2004), through the “generic rules of production” described by Honko (1996),
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to the specific skills associated to a particular content, such as how to make a
specific punch line more effective by underlining it with a facial expression.
4 Zooming in on the declarative content
of the mental text of stand-up comedy:
the punch lines
While the content of the procedural portion of a mental text will inevitably need to
be left to some extent indeterminate (it is, after all, the part of the model called to
justify what is less predictable in the performance of the text), it is now time to
focus on the content of the declarative part. The claim is that it consists, mainly, of
jokes and/or in punch lines. This claim, however, poses a series of questions.
First of all, phenomenological evidence, both based on self-observation of
my experience in delivering stand-up comedy in two languages and on the
interviews collected for this research, seems to suggest that comedians dedicate
great attention to the wording, in both the source language and the target
language, of those parts of discourse from which they expect a humorous
response. There seems to be much confusion, however, both in the literature
and in common use, on what terms best describe these essential parts of
humorous discourse, particularly with regard to the distinction between jokes,
canned jokes and punch lines (sometimes called “punchlines”). A brief discus-
sion about this distinction is then needed.
Attardo (2001), for example, lists among the distinguishing features
between canned and conversational jokes both conventional elements of
their narrative structure, such as “an announcement of the humorous nature
of the forthcoming turn” (2001: 61), and elements of a more cognitive nature,
such as that these jokes are rehearsed (2001: 62). Consequently, Attardo then
declares that “a stand-up routine is a highly rehearsed, planned text, which
consists in a (sometimes large) part of canned jokes” (2001: 62). Applying
Attardo’s own definition, however, would lead to the expectation of finding
announcements of the humorous intention repeated all over the stand-up
comedy routine. Although Attardo himself qualifies the frequency of the pro-
duction of these announcements of intention at the beginning of a canned joke
as happening “often” (2001: 62), not for every canned joke, there is still a
contradiction with the evidence suggesting that these announcements are
actually very rare in stand-up comedy. This observation is mainly based on
personal experience, both as a performer and an audience member of stand-up
comedy, but some independent corroboration can be found in the analysis of
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show transcripts, for instance those collected in Lee (2010). It is, in fact, the
stand-up comedy situation itself that frames the discourse as containing
humorous remarks. If these narrative strategies and structures are used as
the defining characteristic of canned jokes, then, stand-up comedy sets do
not seem to be constituted of them.
Thus, there seems to be a gap in the terminology of humor studies, i. e.
the lack of a term to indicate a joke that, on one hand, does not occur
spontaneously in conversation (so it represents a canned joke in the cognitive
sense) and, on the other hand, is not an instance of a conventional text type
(it is not a canned joke in the narrative sense). Stand-up comedy jokes would
appear to be instances of this type. What both stand-up comedy jokes and
canned jokes (in their stricter, narrative sense) have in common, however, is
that they end in punch lines (at least under the definition of punch line that
will soon be suggested). The difference, then, can be identified in the differ-
ent textual strategies put in place to prepare for the delivery of the punch
line. Focusing on punch lines, then, offers the advantage of avoiding the
conceptual and terminological quagmire around the notion of joke. Moreover,
it appears consistent with the main concern of the performers, particularly
with reference to the task of memorization. For instance, Davies (2008) notes
that “[m]ost good joke-tellers do not memorize jokes. They simply remember
the punch-line [sic]” (2008: 160).
An investigation on the nature of punch lines, then, becomes of the greatest
importance for the understanding of the declarative portion of the mental text of
stand-up comedy and, hence, of the object of the conscious oral self-translation
activity. Oring (1989) notes that “[t]he notion of the punch line remains largely
intuitive” (1989: 351), suggesting a definition from within the framework of an
incongruity theory of humor, particularly the script theory proposed by Raskin
(1985): “The punch line is a device that triggers the perception of an appropriate
incongruity” (1989: 351). Later in the same study, Oring adds that “[a] punch line
must stand in the final position” (1989: 353), to the point that if this rule is violated
“the narrative will tend to be conceptualized less a joke and more as a form as of
humorous tale” (Ibid). The problem seems, again, to consist in the semantic confu-
sion about themeaning of theword “joke”: Oring seems to identify jokeswith canned
jokes in the narrative sense, using instead humorous tales for instances of (still non-
spontaneous, we can assume) humor discourse that do not fall within this strict
definition. Going back to the discussion about the position of punch lines, Attardo
(1996) accepts the restriction of punch lines to final position of a canned joke and,
consequently, feels the need to introduce the concept of jab lines (1996: 91), specify-
ing that “[j]ab lines differ from punch lines in that they may occur in any other
position in the text” (Attardo 2001: 82). The need to introduce this distinction,
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however, appears to be the result of the enforced superimposition on all humorous
texts of the narrative conventions associated to canned jokes in the stricter, narrative
sense (as opposed to the cognitive sense, of jokes that are rehearsed). It is only, in
fact, as an effect of considering stand-up comedy as composed by a sequence of
canned jokes in the narrative sense that the distinction between punch lines at the
end and punch lines in any other position, i. e. jab lines, can make some sense. If,
instead, we abandon the idea of stand-up comedy as composed by a sequence of
canned jokes in the narrative sense (although they can still be considered such in the
cognitive sense, i. e. they are usually not spontaneous), this distinction disappears,
since there is now no narratively recognizable smaller unity of text (within the
enclosing comedy set) to be at the end of.
The objection that not all stand-up comedians make use of punch lines,
which might arise from the previous comments, can also be seen as rooted in
this strict definition of the notion of punch line, which in turn is derived by the
superimposition on stand-up comedy of the rules of canned jokes. It seems that,
regardless of whether the comedian’s discourse can or cannot be reconstructed
as a sequence of short stories with a clear-cut ending, there will always be
sentences within it to which a humorous intention is more obviously attached.
Punch lines, then, will be those sentences to which comedians attach the
intention of producing a humorous effect. This definition allows for an applica-
tion in which the punch line seems to be absent, such as (in the world, this time,
of narratively defined canned jokes) the so-called “shaggy dog stories”, in which
the comic effect is derived by the fact that the expectation produced by a very
long set up is reversed by the delivery of some trivial sentence. It is clear that the
narrator intends this sentence to produce the humorous effect.
From the point of view of an external observer, punch lines will probably be
recognized as such by observing the audience response. This approach, however,
entails difficulties in recognizing a failed punch line – which is a problem that in
turn has consequences for translation, as will soon be discussed. Fortunately, this
study focuses on the phenomenon of self-translation, in which introspective
access to somebody’s own intentions can be reasonably assumed.
5 Focusing on the bilingual perspective:
a model for the translation of the mental
text of stand-up comedy
In Section 4, the discussion on the content of mental text has led to identifying
in the punch lines the most important constituents that are memorized
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declaratively. In this section, it is suggested that the (conscious and precedent to
the performance) translation of punch lines represents the main task involved in
the oral self-translation of stand-up comedy. More specifically, it is one of the
defining characteristics of declarative memory that “at least part of this knowl-
edge can be consciously (‘explicitly’) recollected” (Ullman 2004: 235). The
empirical evidence collected in this study seems to confirm that at least a
portion of the translation effort is conscious and performed on consciously
recalled material. If this is the case, it can only have as its object the part of
memory that is available for conscious recollection, i. e. declarative memory.
Having identified in punch lines the minimal, and functionally most important,
constituents of the declarative content of the mental text of stand-up comedy,
the conclusion is that punch lines will also constitute the main focus of the
conscious and pre-performance translation activities. On the other hand, con-
tent-specific procedural skills, such as the production of the most effective facial
expression to underline a specific punch line, will be simply re-deployed for the
target audience and in the target situation, which will represent the new “bike”
that the performers will “ride”. This does not mean that they will not produce, in
the example, a different facial expression. Considerations of the different value
associated with expressivity in the source and target culture might convince the
performers that, for instance, a more explicit expression is expected by an
Italian audience than by a British audience. This sort of “translation”, however,
will happen directly on the stage and unconsciously.
The declarative part of the mental text of stand-up comedy, instead, will be
translated consciously. In order to gain a better understanding of how this might
happen, a theoretical model of the different phases involved in this process can be
suggested. A useful concept for this is that of mental model developed by Johnson-
Laird (1983). According to Johnson-Laird, discourse comprehension, and under-
standing in general, consists in deriving from the discourse situation a mental
model of some state of affairs. When discussing how this type of semantics can be
applied to propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, Johnson-Laird suggests that a
“propositional attitude is a relation between an individual and that individual’s
mental model of the relevant state of affairs” (1983: 433). To understand “X believes
that snow is white”we will, first, construct a mental model representing the state of
affairs “Snow is white”, then we will construct a mental representation of the agent
“X” and, finally, wewill construct a mental representation of the relation of believing
directed towards that mental model by that agent. Generally speaking, we will need
to embed thementalmodel of the state of affairs expressedby the propositionP into a
mental model of the relation towards it, i. e. of X believes that P.
A similar embedding can be hypothesized in those situations in which the
main goal is not the understanding of “what is said”, but of the discourse
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situation itself. According to Setton (1999), for instance, this is what happens in
simultaneous interpreting. Applying to this situation the theoretical idiom of
mental models, Setton suggests that the interpreter constructs a mental repre-
sentation not only of the speaker(s), but also of the audience, of their utterances
and of the effect that the speakers are understood to want to produce on their
audience by means of these same utterances. If the speaker is saying “Snow is
white”, the simultaneous interpreter will produce a mental model that includes
not only the (embedded) mental model representing snow being white, but also
the (embedding) mental model of the speaker’s intentions in producing such
utterance, which also includes a representation of the audience. Along similar
lines, de Jongste (2016) offers an explanation of the recognition of the speaker’s
humorous intent based on the perception of a shift between the mental model
publicly expressed by the speaker and the audience’s reconstruction of what de
Jongste calls his/her “private mental model” (2016: 108). For instance, in de
Jongste’s example (2016: 111), when comedian Eddie Izzard pretends (publically)
to believe that the humming sounds of Star Wars derive from Gregorian chant,
which the audience know it is unlikely to be a (privately) held belief.
While constructing the mental model of comedic discourse, however, come-
dians are not only concerned with the perception of their humorous intent, but also
with the conditions of its success. In order to understand better what might be
involved in the construction of such a model, it might then be useful to point out
that, according to Johnson-Laird, “the mental model is constructed on the basis of
truth conditions of the propositions expressed by the sentences in the discourse”
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 407). This application of the concept of truth conditions,
however, seems to be problematic in the case of those propositions that Austin
(1962) and Searle (1969) called speech acts, for instance commands. Singh (1993)
suggests that this problemwould be resolved by identifying the semantics of speech
acts not with its truth conditions, but with its satisfaction conditions, defined as “the
conditions under which we would affirm that the given speech act had been
satisfied, e. g. a command is satisfied if it is obeyed and a promise is satisfied
when it is kept” (1993: 49). The mental model associated with an utterance of the
command “bring me of glass of water”will, then, include themental representation
of the desired act of the receiver bringing a glass of water to the speaker.
If instances of comic discourse can be represented as speech acts, then, it
will be possible to suggest a theory of comic discourse in terms of the mental
models that represent the conditions of their satisfaction. Raskin (1985), for one,
briefly discusses considering jokes as speech acts, conceding that “[i]t is not too
difficult to propose a definition of the speech act of making a joke” (1985: 328)
but rejecting the approach as “reductionist” (Ibid.). Raskin’s concern seems to
rely on the risk of giving too much importance to the illocutionary aspect of
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jokes, and humorous texts in general, at the expense of an understanding of
their content. This legitimate concern, on the other hand, should not result into
the opposite error of forgetting the importance, for the production of comic
discourse, of the intention to obtain a specific reaction in the audience.
In the light of these requirements and concerns, the theoretical idiom of
propositional attitudes and/or sentential attitudes, in combination with the
notion of mental models, can be seen as even more promising for a theory of
comic discourse than the idiom of speech acts itself. While understanding
the satisfaction conditions of “bring me a glass of water” can be seen as relatively
easy, defining the satisfaction conditions of an act of comic discourse is more
problematic. The most natural suggestion would be to identify these conditions
with the production of laughter in the audience; nevertheless, not only is laughter
a very heterogeneous phenomenon (see Chafe 2007), but satisfaction conditions
might include also smiling, frowning or, according to my experience, even recoil-
ing in (a paradoxically amusing type of) horror. In other words, the complexity of
the desired response associated with comic discourse would make every attempt
to define it in purely behavioral terms as reductionist as Raskin feared.
The same, however, cannot be said with regard to a description in terms of
propositional or, better (taking into consideration the importance, for some jokes,
for instance puns, of their linguistic surface structure, not only of their meaning)
sentential attitudes: comedy discourse, in these terms, can be seen as constituted by
(among other things, but with specific importance) a set of sentences “S” (the punch
lines) delivered with the intentions of producing in the recipient “X” a specific
attitude towards them: the attitude “X finds S funny”. The task of understanding
what this finding S funny sentential attitude actually means and entails, i. e. what
people find funny andwhy, is probably the ultimate goal of the entire field of humor
research. As such, in the present context this sentential attitude will need to be
proposed as an undefined element of the theory here outlined.
Applying to this specific discourse situation the apparatus of mental
model, the following dynamic model of what happens in oral self-translation
of stand-up comedy can be proposed. First, the comedian/translator produces
a mental model representing the sentences in the source language, their
intended (and/or, as will soon be clarified, actual) audience and the finding
S funny attitude of these audiences towards them. This is usually based on
actual performances, so, as well as the semantic memory required to store the
sentences themselves, this mental representation will also involve the episodic
memory of reactions from specific audiences in specific performance situa-
tions. It is, however, also usually the case that the same sentences were
delivered (although still in the same language) in front of different audiences
and in different situations, typically with different results. While based on
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episodic memory of actual reactions, then, this mental model will arguably
also require a certain level of generalization.
Secondly, the comedian/translator produces a mental model of a discourse
situation in which the source language is replaced with the target language and
the (remembered and/or generalized) source audience is replaced with the
anticipated target audience. At this stage, for each relevant sentence, i. e. (at
least) for each punch line, the comedian/translator produces a mental transla-
tion of the sentence into the target language and runs the model in order to
predict whether each candidate translation is likely to produce the desired
finding S funny sentential attitude towards it for the anticipated target audience.
As Johnson-Laird (1983) suggested, the possibility of prediction is the greatest
advantage offered by mental models. If the prediction does not produce the
satisfied result in this mental simulation, for example because the cultural
reference used in the punch line is likely to be unknown to the target audience,
a better candidate translation is produced and mentally tested.
In the next phase, the translated text is tried out in front of an actual
audience and the response is fed back into the model used for future transla-
tions, which at this point (just like the model for the source text) will also
partially rely on memory and experience, not only on prediction. The transla-
tions that did not work will be revised and these modified versions will be
played “in the theatre of the mind” in search for a better translation, until
they are also tested in front of a real audience. If the new translations succeed
in producing the desired response, they are kept, otherwise the cycle is repeated
(the literature on plans calls this a Test-Operate-Test-Exit, or TOTE, plan. See
Miller et al. 1960: 27), until either a successful translation is found, or the
sentence is declared “untranslatable” and dropped from the target text.
Interestingly, the evidence collected from the interviews suggests that this
mark of untranslatability was only applied to wordplay and to those punch lines
based on culture-specific elements for which no functional equivalent was
found, which were considered the exception. An example can be seen in the
following excerpt from my interview with Romina Puma:
GP – Can you remember cases when the translation of material resulted particularly
problematic?
RP – Not that many, most of my material works equally well in a language as in the other.
Obviously there are some references that needed to be adapted.
All the participants interviewed seemed to agree on this relatively non-problematic
nature of their self-translation. Moreover, some of the adaptations were perceived
as more effective than the original ones, even leading to the retrofitting of the new
reference to the original language when possible.
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6 Conclusions
The notion that stand-up comedy performances are enabled by a mental text
and the related notion of oral self-translation from a mental text bring with it a
sense of opacity to direct observation that calls for a modelling effort in
theoretical and sometimes abstract terms. In the previous sections, this effort
resulted in the suggestion of a theoretical apparatus that comprises elements
borrowed from the fields of cognitive science, psycholinguistics and philoso-
phy of language. By using a phenomenological approach based on interviews,
this theory was, where possible, corroborated against the experience of the
translation activity collected from a sample of bilingual comedians. The inter-
views, indeed, both corroborate the idea that conscious translation does take
place and that this process does not require the support of a written text.
Moreover, they corroborate a conception of stand-up comedy in which some
elements are constant and repeatable, while others are left to improvisation
and variation. The result is an idea of the (mental) text of stand-up comedy
based on a combination of declarative and procedural memory, with the
declarative part considered essential to translation and constituted, most
importantly, by the punch lines. Secondly, a dynamic model of its translation
was suggested, based on the notion of a mental model representing the
(predicted first, actual later) comic efficacy of these sentences. The hope,
then, is that this double theoretical model might be useful in capturing, on
one side, the complex nature of stand-up comedy and, on the other, the
iterative and open-ended nature of its oral self-translation. More generally
speaking, this effort can offer a contribution to filling a gap in our under-
standing of those forms of oral communication that, on one hand, do not
represent instances of mere conversational spontaneity and, on the other, do
not seem to be completely “scripted” either. Stand-up comedy, then, can still
be investigated as a form of conversation, but this time as a conversation with
a content, which can, inter alia, represents the object of translation and be
investigated as such.
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